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392 SoMMER v. METAL TRADES CouNCIL [ 40 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 21757. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
HERMAN C. SOMMER, Respondent, v. ME'l'AL TRADES 
COUNCIL OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA et al., Ap-
pellants. 
[1] Labor-Police Power.-The state has power to set the limits 
of permissible contest available to industrial combatants, so 
long as constitutional guaranties are observed. 
[2] !d.-Police Power-State or Federal ControL-The factors of 
protection and condemnation under the National Labor Re-
lations Act largely determine whether an area of industrial 
dispute is one closed to state control; if the subject matter 
of a local statute is otherwise one within the area of per-
missible exercise of state power in the maintenance of in-
dustrial peace, and state policy is consistent with federal 
policy, the state does not necessarily encroach on the area 
of control vested in the National Labor Relations Board. 
[3] !d.-Police Power-State or Federal ControL-If a union's 
concerted activity is not protected under the National Labor 
Relations Act, it is not immunized from state control, and 
such activity is not protected under the federal act if an-
other union is certified by the national board as the collective 
bargaining representative of plaintiff's employees. 
[4] !d.-Police Power-State or Federal ControL-In absence of 
national board's certification of a union as the collective bar-
gaining representative of plaintiff's employees, there is no 
immunity under state law if the employees' local union con-
stitutes a collective bargaining representative within the 
meaning of the Jurisdictional Strike Act. (Lab. Code, § 1115 
et seq.) 
[5] !d.-Police Power-State or Federal ControL-Where certifica-
tion of a union other than defendant union is not shown, a 
case of condemnation of union activity under the National 
Labor Relations Act is not presented. 
[6] !d.-Injunctive Relief.-The state policy of outlawing juris-
dictional coercive activity in the maintenance of peaceful 
industrial relations justifies injunctive as well as legal relief. 
[7] !d.-Injunctive Relief.-Provisions of amended National Labor 
Relations Act, § 303 (b), confining the action which may be 
brought in state courts for unfair labor practices of a union 
[1] See 5 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Labor, § 4 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Labor, § 409 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] Labor, §1; [6,7,10] Labor, §25; 
[8] Labor, § 23; [9] Labor, § 21. 
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to that for recovery of damages to business or property, affect 
state jurisdiction in matters covered by that act but do not 
preclude local injunctive relief in an area open to state con-
trol. 
[8] Id.-Picketing.-In view of the constitutional right of states 
to proscribe picketing in the furtherance of unlawful ob-
jectives, labor unions do not have the right to publicize a 
labor dispute by means of placards and picketing if the 
objective is shown to be in violation of the Jurisdictional 
Strike Act. 
[9] !d.-Jurisdictional Strike Act.-A local unaffiliated organiza-
tion of nonunion employees, if qualified and undominated by 
the employer, may constitute a labor organization for col-
lective bargaining purposes within the meaning of the Juris-
dictional Strike Act. (Lab. Code, § 1117.) 
[10] !d.-Injunctive Relief.-Where the factual elements which 
would support an injunction to restrain picketing arising out 
of a dispute between defendant labor unions and a local unit 
organized by plaintiff's employees cannot be finally resolved 
until a trial on the merits, jurisdiction to order a preliminary 
injunction to maintain the status quo pending such trial is 
established on a prima facie showing of qualification and 
voluntary character of the employees' organization, and such 
injunctive order will not be disturbed in the absence of a 
showing of abuse of discretion. 
'-""'"'-de~---""''"'"'"'~'""""''-'··' H. -'-<ib• :.~,,~, ~'-~" ---_;;,,./~!: 
-the Superior CourC~f-L~s 
Angeles County granting a preliminary injunction. W. Tur-
ney Fox, Judge. Affirmed. 
Arthur Garrett, John C. Stevenson, Todd & Todd and Clar-
ence E. Todd for Appellants. 
Charles P. Seully and Tobriner & Lazarus as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellants. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, "William French Smith, James 
R. Hutter and C. Robert Simpson, Jr., for Respondent. 
Roth & Bahrs as Amiei Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal by the defendants from an 
order granting a preliminary injunction. 
The controversy involves concerted union activities which 
bring into question the application of the Jurisdictional 
Strike Act of this state ( § 1115 et seq., Labor Code added 
394 Sol\CVIER v. METAL 'l'RADES CouNCIL [40 C.2d 
by Stats. 194 7, p. 2592). The constitutional validity of 
that statute has been determined in Seven Up Bottling Co. 
v. Orocer-y D1·ivers Union, L. A. No. 21347 (ante, p. 368 
I ~5-t P .2d 544]). rrhe question is whether the state court 
had jurisdiction to order the preliminary injunction and, if 
it had jurisdiction whether it properly exercised its discre-
tion in directing that it should issue. 
For 31 years the plaintiff has. manufactured, distributed 
and installed auto service stations and equipment. He em-
ploys 50 persons. The defendant unions are affiliated with 
the American Federation of Labor. The individual defend-
ants are members and officers of the unions. 
Prior to July, 1949, the plaintiff's employees were unor-
ganized. In that month the defendants demanded of the 
plaintiff that he recognize the unions as the exclusive col-
lective bargaining representatives of the employees, and that 
only members of the unions be employed by him. In Sep-
tember the employees held meetings to organize The Workers 
Association of Manufacturers and Builders of Auto Service 
Union Local No. 1, without A. F. of L. or other union affilia-
tion, and demanded that the employer recognize it as their 
exclusive bargaining representative. The plaintiff refused to 
recognize either Local No. 1 or the unions as the employees' 
collective bargaining agent. Peaceful picketing and secondary 
boycott activities, including the representation that the plain-
tiff was unfair to organized labor, were commenced by the de-
fendants on September 15, 1949. 
Also in September the employees' Local filed a petition 
with the National Labor Relations Board for certification 
as the representative for collective bargaining purposes. The 
unions intervened and contested for recognition. On Febru-
ary 24, 1950, the National Board found that the plaintiff 
was engaged in commerce within the meaning of the federal 
labor relations law and ordered an election. The plaintiff 
alleges that an election was conducted by the Local; that 
25 employees voted for the Local, seven of which votes were 
challenged by the defendants, and that five employees voted 
for the unions. It does not appear whether the election was 
pursuant to the board's direction or whether certification of 
a collective bargaining representative followed. 
rrhe defendants continued their concerted activities and 
the plaintiff commenced this action for injunctive relief and 
damages in March, 1950. A hearing on the return to an 
order to show cause was had on the verified complaint and 
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numerous affidavits. The court granted the preliminary in-
junction enjoining the defendants from conducting the pick-
eting and secondary boycott activities and from represent-
ing to others that the plaintiff is unfair to organized labor. 
The plaintiff's employees are not on strike. The dispute 
is between the two groups concerning union organization of 
the plaintiff's employees, collective bargaining representa-
tion and consequent work assignment. It is not questioned 
that the union picketing and secondary boycott activities 
substantially interfered with the conduct of the plaintiff's 
business. 
The plaintiff contends that the concerted union activity 
presents a case of a jurisdictional strike which is in viola-
tion of and enjoinable pursuant to the Jurisdictional Strike 
Act of which the state court has jurisdiction. The defend-
ants contend that their activity is not in violation of the 
act and in any event is governable solely pursuant to the 
federal law. 
Section 1115 of the Labor Code declares a jurisdictional 
strike to be against the public policy of the state and unlaw-
ful. Section 1116 provides the remedies by injunction and 
damages. ''Labor organization'' is defined as any organiza·· 
tion or any agency or employee representation committee or 
any local unit thereof in which employees participate which 
exists for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning 
grievances and labor disputes and is not found to be financed, 
interfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer 
( § 1117). Section 1118 defines "jurisdictional strike" as a 
''concerted refusal to perform work for an employer or any 
other concerted interference with an employer's operation 
or business, arising out of a controversy between two or more 
labor organizations as to which of them has or should have 
the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer 
on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out 
of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as 
to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to 
have its members perform work for an employer." Section 
1119 preserves, subject to the foregoing restrictions, the right 
of collective bargaining and the right of any individual vol-
untarily to become or remain a member of a labor organiza-
tion or personally to request any other individual to join 
a labor organization. 
A policy prohibiting concerted jurisdictional activity is 
also contained in the federal law. Section 8 (b) ( 4) of the 
396 SoThiMER v. METAL TRADES CouNCIL [ 40 C.2d 
amended Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act, July 
5, 1935, 49 Stats. 452, ch. 372, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158, as amended 
by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stats. 140) 
specifies concerted jurisdictional activities which are declared 
to be unfair labor practices on the part of labor organiza-
tions, and section 303 (a) of the amended act declares the 
conduct to be unlawful. (See discussion Teller, Labor Dis-
putes and Collective Bargaining, 1950 Supplement, p. Ill 
et seq., p. 121 et seq.) For present purposes it is sufficient 
to note that section 8(b) (4) (C) declares it to be an unfair 
labor practice for a labor organization to engage in concerted 
activity (as here) for the purpose of forcing or requiring 
the employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor 
organization as the representative of his employees if another 
labor organization has been certified as their representative 
under the provisions of the act. 
The preliminary injunction was ordered in May, 1950. 
The trial court appears not to have been informed as to any 
finality in the representation proceeding before the National 
Labor Relations Board. For the purpose of this appeal it is 
assumed that the plaintiff is engaged in interstate commerce 
and that there is no certification of a collective bargaining 
representative for his employees under the federal act. In 
the representation proceeding the unions sought to introduce 
evidence of employer domination of the Local, but the evi-
dence was refused consideration because the issue was not 
subject to litigation in that proceeding. Subsequently the 
unions filed charges of employer coercion and domination of 
the Local in violation of sections 8 (a) ( 1) and ( 2) of the 
federal act. In December, 1949, the evidence of domination 
was held to be insufficient to warrant investigation at that 
time. On September 22d and December 5, 1949, the employer 
filed with the National Board charges of union jurisdictional 
activity in violation of section 8(b) (4) of the act. On De-
cember 28th the charges were dismissed for lack of evidence 
of violation at that time. It does not appear that the charges 
were renewed after a possible certification of the employees' 
Local as their representative for collective bargaining pur-
poses. 
It may also be assumed that the evidence which was relevant 
in the representation contest and to the several charges of 
unfair labor practices before the National Board bears on 
the issues here. But it does not follow that the state court 
does not have jurisdiction of this controversy. 
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Gerry of California v. St~perior Court (June, 1948), 32 
Cal.2d 119 [ 194 P .2d 689], does not determine with finality 
the matter of jurisdiction on this appeal. The Gerry case 
involved interstate commerce but was not concerned with 
union jurisdictional activity as defined in our statute. Second-
ary boycott activities were there employed by A.F. of L. 
unions for the purpose of organizing the petitioner's non-
union employees. ln view of the fact that the court in In re 
Blaney, 30 Cal.2d 643 [184 P.2d 892], had held invalid the 
hot cargo and secondary boycott act of 1941, the petitioner 
agreed that there was no California statute which could fur-
nish equitable redress. The petitioner contended that the 
state had concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor 
Relations Board to enforce the provisions of the federal act. 
'l'he decision rejecting the contention was a determination 
that in the absence of a valid applicable local statute afford-
ing relief, facts which amount to unfair labor practices under 
the federal act are cognizable exclusively in a proceeding be-
fore the National Board. This court in In re Dei:'iilva, ;};) 
Cal.2d 76, 78 [199 P.2d 6], again recognized that the Gerry 
case involved the question of the concurrent jurisdiction of 
the state court to enforce the federal act. Thus the problem 
now is not whether the state has concurrent jurisdiction with 
the National Board to enforce the federal act. 'l'he question 
is whether the state court has jurisdiction to enforce the 
provisions of a state statute making the defined union juris-
dictional activity unlawful and subject to restraint. 
At the time of the decision in the Gerry case, Bethlehem 
Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board (April, 
1947), 330 U.S. 767 [67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234], was the 
latest holding of the Supreme Court that except where juris-
diction had been ceded by the National Board to a state 
agency, state and federal action in matters covered by the 
federal act could not coexist. The Supreme Court has since 
recognized the validity of state action in those cases where 
the conduct complained of is neither forbidden nor legalized 
and approved under the federal act. 
The Bethlehem Steel formula was followed in La Crosse 
Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Ernp. Relations Board (Jan., 1949), 
336 U.S. 18 [69 S.Ct. 379, 93 L.Ed. 463], where cession had 
not been granted. The jurisdiction of the local board in a 
certification procedure was denied because of inconsistencies 
between the federal and the state acts. The court said at 
398 SoMMER v. lVIB.:•rAL TRADES CouNCIL [ 40 C.2d 
page 26: ''A. certification by a state board under a different 
or eonflieting theory of representation may therefore be as 
readily cli,;ruptive of the practice under the federal act as if 
the orders of the two boards made a head-on collision. These 
are the very real potentials of conflict which lead us to allow 
supremacy to the federal scheme even though it has not y<"t 
been applied in any formal way to this particular employer." 
[1] The state power to set the limits of permissible cmJ-
test available to industrial combatants, so long as constitn-
tioual guaranties are observed, is not open to question. (Senn 
v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 [57 S.Ct. 857, 
81 L.Ed. 1229] ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 [ 60 
S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093].) International Union v. Wiscons1:n 
Emp. Relat1'ons Board (Feb., 1949), 336 U.S. 245 [69 S.Ct. 
516, 93 L.Ed. 651], again recognized the area of control open 
to the state (see numerous cases cited at p. 257; cf. Giboney 
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 [69 S.Ct. 684, 93 
L.Ed. 834] ; see, also, Gerry of California v. Superior Court, 
supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 125 and cases cited). There the local 
board ordered the union to cease intermittent unannounced 
work stoppages for unstated purposes and other concerted 
activity except by leaving the premises in an orderly manner 
for the purpose of exercising the protected right of going on 
strike. The Supreme Court pointed out that the enjoined 
activity was neither forbidden nor protected by the federal 
act. 
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rela-
tions Board (Mar., 1949), 336 U.S. 301 [69 S.Ct. 584,93 L.Ed. 
691], concerned a Vvisconsin law which provided for a 
maintenance-of-membership clause in the labor contract when 
a two-thirds employee vote favored the inclusion in a ref-
erendum conducted by the \Visconsin board. No referendum 
had been conducted under the state or federal act, but in 
January, 1947, an employee was discharged pursuant to such 
a clause in the current labor contract. The state court sus-
tained the jurisdiction of the local board in the issuance of a 
cease and desist order to the employer including a direction 
for reinstatement and back pay. With the less restrictive 
conditions in the federal act the Supreme Court found no 
conflict between it and the state act on the subject of union 
seeurity maintenance. In affirming the state judgment, the 
court reviewing the legislative history and debate and eon-
eluded that Congress did not intend to interfere with state 
adion on the subject. Cession was deemed essential only 
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where the state and federal laws were parallel. Where there 
was no overlapping, cession was said to be unnecessary be-
eause the state's jurisdiction remains unimpaired. The court 
also recognized the impact of the 1947 amendments to require 
a modification of the Bethlehem Steel decision in cases where 
the National Board had declined jurisdiction, in order to per-
mit freedom of state action including pursuit of the more 
restrictive state policies. The modification was held to apply 
so long as Congress did not manifest an unambiguous inten-
tion to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the National Board, 
and the state policy was not inconsistent with national policy. 
Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board 
(Feb., 1950), 338 U.S. 953 [70 S.Ct. 491, 94 L.Ed. 588], also 
involved the maintenance of union membership. On December 
6. 1946, the local board orderrd the reemployment of employee 
Stokrs who on May 9, 1945, had been discharged for failnre 
to maintain his union membership. The state court determined 
that the local board had jurisdiction on the authority of the 
Alg-oma Plywood decision. The Supreme Court reversed 
witl10ut opinion citing Bethlehem Steel and La Crosse. Bnt 
it <'annot be assumed that the Supreme Court intended to 
overrule the Algoma Plywood declarations. It must on the 
rontrary be assumed that the facts in Plankinton wonlcl dis-
elose a federally protected union maintenance clause ·which 
wonlo form the basis of the implied conclusion of absenee of 
state jurisdiction. 
International Union Etc. ~1. & A. I. W. v. O'Brien (May, 
1950). 339 U.S. 454 r10 S.Ct. 781. 94 L.Ed. 978], involved a 
strike vote provision of the Michigan labor mediation law. 
It was held that since this was a protected and regulated right 
in a field occupied by Congress it was closed to state regulation 
11ncler a statute which confiieted with the exercise of federally 
protected labor rights. The court recogni.:~;ed that in Inter-
nfltional Union v. Wiscons1:n Emp. Relat?:ons Board, .mvrll 
(336 U.S. 245, 252), it had reaffirmed the principle that if 
''Congress has protected the union conduct which the State 
has forbidden ... the state legislation mnst yield" (339 
TTS. at p. 459). 
[2] It is thus apparent that the factors of protection and 
eondemnation under the federal act largely determine whether 
the area is one closed to state control. The decisions indicate 
that the presence of those factors are deemed to disclose an 
intention on the part of Congress to place exclusive jurisdic-
400 SoMMER v. METAL TRADE.s CouNciL [ 40 0.2d 
tion in the National Board. They also demonstrate that the 
problem is not one which in every case is resolved solely by 
looking to the provisions of the federal act; but that if the 
subject matter of the local statute is otherwise one within 
the area of permissible exercise of state power in the main-
tenance of industrial peace, and state policy is consistent with 
federal policy, the state does not necessarily encroach upon 
the area of control vested in the National Board. .And in 
some cases it is seen that the presence or absence of the 
factors of protection or condemnation under the federal act 
may be resolved by the fact of whether the National Board 
has or has not assumed jurisdiction. 
The extent to which the organizational coercive measures 
are lawful is not involved at this time. It is sufficient to note 
that the statutory restrictions on jurisdictional strike activity 
are consistent with the federal policy enacted in 1947 defining 
as an unfair labor practice activity by a union which seeks 
to substitute itself as the collective bargaining agent in the 
place of one duly selected by the employees. There is here 
therefore no conflict with federal policy such as was con-
sidered fatal in Amalgamated Assn. v. Wisconsin Emp. Re-
lations Board (Feb. 1951), 340 U.S. 383 [71 S.Ot. 359, 95 L. 
Ed. 364], in connection with a statute outlawing all strike 
activity on the part of public utility employees and sub-
stituting arbitration in the settlement of disputes. It was 
there pointed out that the activity forbidden by the Wisconsin 
law was one protected under the federal law. 
[3] If the union activity here involved is not protected 
under the federal act it is not immunized from state action. 
'fhe union concerted activity was not protected under the 
federal act if another union was certified by the national 
board as the collective bargaining representative of the 
plaintiff's employees. [4] .And in the absence of such 
certification there is no immunity under the state law if 
the employees' Local constitutes a collective bargaining repre-
sentative within the meaning of the jurisdictional strike 
provisions. (cf. Park & Tilford I. Corp. v. International etc. 
of 'l'earnsters (Jan., 1946), 27 Oa1.2d 599, 603, 604 [165 P.2d 
891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].) [ 5] Since the certification of a 
union other than the defendant is not shown, a case of con-
demnation of the union activity under the federal act is not 
presented. And as it does not appear that the National Board 
has seen fit to act finally in either the representation or the 
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unfair charges proceedings there is involved a possible area of 
activity which is neither protected nor condemned under the 
federal act, and pursuant to the foregoing decisions is subject 
to state action under the anti-jurisdictional strike provisions 
of the Labor Code. 
1'hus, there is here an area open to the state for the 
exercise of its police power. [6] The state policy of out-
lawing jurisdictional coercive activity in the maintenance of 
peaceful industrial relations justifies the injunctive as well as 
legal relief. [7] The provisions of section 303 (b) of the 
amended federal act confining the action which may be brought 
in the state courts to that for recovery of damages to business 
or property are concerned with state jurisdiction in matters 
covered by that act. 'l'hey do not preclude local injunctive 
relief in an area open to state control. 
[8] In view of the many decisions recognizing the con-
stitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in the fur-
therance of unlawful objectives (Giboney v. Empire Storage 
& Ice Co., supra, 336 U.S. 490, 502-503, citing Bakery &; P. 
Drivers & H., I. B. T.v. Wahl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-777 [62 S.Ct. 
816, 86 L.Ed. 1178] ; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 
464 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985] ; International Brotherhood 
C. W. & H. Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474 [70 S.Ct. 773, 94 
L.Ed. 995, 13 A.L.R.2d 631]; Bu1:lding Service Emp. Intl. 
Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 [70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 
1 045] citing numerous cases; Internat1'onal Etc. Electrical 
Workers v. National Labor Relations Board (June, 1951), 341 
U.S. 694, 705 [71 S.Ct. 954, 95 L.Ed. 1299]; see, also, James 
v. Man:nship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 729-730 [155 P.2d 329, 160 
A.L.R. 900] and cases cited; Rubin v. American Sportsmen 
Television Eq. Soc., I_;, A. No. 21803, post, p. 412 [254 P.2d 
510] ), it may not successfully be contended that the de-
fendant unions have the right to publicize the present contro-
versy by means of placards and picketing if the objective is 
shown to be in violation of the ,Jurisdictional Strike Act. 
As said in the Hughes case at page 464, the "Constitution does 
not demand that the element of communication in picketing 
prevail over the mischief furthered by its use in these situa-
tions" ; and in the Hanke case at page 4 7 4, that "while picket-
ing has an ingredient of communication it cannot dogmatically 
be equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of 
speech .... The effort in the cases has been to strike a balance 
between the constitutional protection of the element of com-
402 SoMMER v. METAr_, TRADE's CouNCIL [ 40 C.2d 
munication in picketing and 'the power of the State to set the 
limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.' '' 
In Gerry of Calif01·nia v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.2d 
119, there was an attempt by the petitioner's employees to 
form their own organization for collective bargaining purposes 
and an unsuccessful attempt to obtain certification under the 
federal act. The events took place in November, 1947, after 
the effective dates of the Labor Management Relations Act, 
1947 (August), and of the state Jurisdictional Strike Act 
(September, 1947). In that case apparently neither coun-
sel nor court considered that the effort to form a local 
nnaffiliated organization of the nonunion employees consti-
tuted a labor organization within the meaning of section 1117 
of the Labor Code. Consequently the petitioner's employees 
were treated as unorganized for the purpose of the decision in 
that case. 
The controversy here presents for the first time the question 
whether a somewhat similar attempt effects a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of the statute. [9] At this point 
it may not be seriously questioned that such a local unit, 
if qua.lified and undominated by the employer, may constitute 
a labor organization for collective bargaining purposes. That 
it may is clearly indicated by the language of the statute. That 
effect was also impliedly determined by the order of the 
National Board in the representation proceeding and in the 
dismissal of the charges based on alleged employer domination. 
[10] But here the factual elements which would support 
the granting of an injunction cannot be finally resolved until 
a trial on the merits. In the meantime the trial court was 
justified in maintaining the status quo until it should 
decide the questions of the lawfulness of the union activity and 
the propriety of issuing a permanent injunction. The re-
quirements of qualification and voluntary character of the 
Pmployees' organization are preliminarily met by the prima 
facie showing in the complaint and the affidavits, and thereby 
the trial court's jurisdiction to order the temporary relief is 
established. On the application for the preliminary order 
thP court also could, and undoubtedly did, weigh the probable 
injury which would ensue to the plaintiff by denying the 
temporary relief as against the absence of probable injury 
which would accrue to the defendants by granting it. The 
record does not indicate that the court abused its discretion-
ary power in making these determinations adversely to the 
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defendants and in granting the injunctive order pending a 
trial on the merits. 
The order is affirmed. 
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
GARTER, J.-I dissent. 
'l'he majority opin-ion concedes that the activities of de-
fendants unions and Local 1 and its effect on plaintiff em-
ployer are within the jurisdict?:on of the National Labor Re-
lations Board and the terms of the Labor JJianagement Rela-
tions Act of 1:HL'7 (29 U.S.C.A., § 141 et seq.) and obviously 
that is true. It goes on to hold, however, that such activi-
ties are also within the purview of our statute known as the 
,Jurisdictional Strike Act. (Lab. Code, § 1115 et seq.) It 
then concludes that the state act and state courts in enforc-
ing it can operate concurr·ently on those activities. It at-
tempts to distinguish Gerry of California v. Superior Court, 
32 Cal.2d 119 [194 P.2d 689} and In 1"e DeSilva, 33 Cal.2d 
76 [199 P.2d 6], on the ground that in those cases there was 
no state statute or policy which regulated the activity. That, 
however, is immaterial for those cases further state that where 
the activity comes within the federal act, exclus-ive jurisdic-
tion is conferred on the board under that act. That exclusive 
jurisdiction does not disappear merely because the state passes 
a statute on the same subject. 
'l'he fundamental premise of the majority opinion, that 
activities in connection with labor disputes although within 
the jurisdiction of the federal law and national board, may 
also be regulated and controlled by state statutes and enforced 
by state courts, is clearly erroneous as I will endeavor to 
demonstrate hereinafter. First, reference should be made to 
the most recent case called to my attention, of Capital Service, 
Inc. v. N at·ional Labor Relations Board/ where the premise 
of the majority opinion is squarely repudiated. There the 
federal district court had granted, at the request of the 
National Labor Helations Board, an injunction against an 
employer enjoining it from enforcing· an injunction it had 
obtained in a California superior court enjoining con-
certed activities (a boycott and picketing) by a union. The 
federal court held that the activities violated the federal law 
and hence the California co1trt had no j1frisdiction to enjoin 
*A rehearing was granted. 
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the activities and the district court was correct in so holding. 
The court stated : 
''The question then arises whether, since both these acts 
of picketing are in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, the 
state courts are excluded from attempting to enjoin such 
acts where prohibited by the State or federal law? 
"We think that the control by the federal tribunals is 
exclusive. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a) of the original Act pro-
vided: 'The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to 
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor prac-
tice (listed in section 158) affecting commerce. This power 
shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any other 
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be 
established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise.' (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
''As amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, these two sentences 
remain save that the words 'shall be exclusive and' are 
stricken, and the states given power of enforcement by agree-
ment with the board in certain cases by adding the following 
proviso after the word 'otherwise' : 'Provided, That the Board 
is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or 
Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases 
in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, com-
munications, and transportation except where predominantly 
local in character) even though such cases may involve labor 
disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State 
or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such 
cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding 
provision of this subchapter or has received a construction 
inconsistent therewith.' 
"We construe this amendment as giving to a state a 
right of enforcement only by an agreement reached by it 
with the board. Here there was no such agreement.'' 
In the instant case it appears from the complaint that 
plaintiff is doing business under the fictitious name of Comwel 
Company in Lynwood, California. His business consists 
of manufacture, distribution and installation of steel ma-
chinery and equipment, chiefly for service stations. Defend-
ants are various local labor unions affiliated with the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor and members and officers of those 
unions. Plaintiff employs about 50 people. 
An organization called Workers Association of Manufac-
turers and Builders ·of Auto Service Union Local No. 1 (here-
after called Local 1), not financed or controlled by plaintiff, 
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organized early in September, 1949, filed on September 16, 
1949, a petition with the National Labor Relations Board, 
claiming the right to represent plaintiff's employees in col-
lective bargaining, in whieh plaintiff was a party, and one 
of defendant unions intervened. On February 24, 1950, 
the board ordered an election to determine whether the 
union or Local 1 should be the bargaining representative. It 
also determined that plaintiff was engaged in a business af-
fecting interstate commerce. At the election a majority voted 
in favor of Local 1. 
On September 22, 1949, plaintiff filed with the board a 
charge, later amended, against some of defendant unions, 
claiming the union was engaged in unfair labor practices 
affecting interstate commerce under and in violation of the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A., § 158 
[b] [4] [A] and [B]) in that the unions were inducing other 
employees of other employers to refuse to use and handle 
plaintiff's products, with the object of forcing other employers 
to bargain with a union not certified as a representative, by 
picketing and otherwise. Plaintiff thus admitted that inter-
state commerce was affected. On December 28, 1949, the 
regional director of the board refused to issue a complaint 
in the matter for ''lack of sufficient evidence of violations'' 
of the act. No appeal was taken from such refusal. 
On October 28, 1949, one of defendant unions filed a charge 
with the board alleging unfair labor practices affecting inter-
state commerce in violation of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (29 U.S.C.A., § 158 [a] [1] and [2]) in that Local 
1 was formed by plaintiff to influence his employees in an 
election by them to determine their bargaining representative. 
On December 13, 1949, the regional director of the board 
refused to issue a complaint for lack of evidence. On appeal 
to the general counsel, the refusal was affirmed. 
The charge in the complaint and affidavits is that defend-
ants demanded that plaintiff accept them as the exclusive 
bargaining representative for his employees and to that end 
defendants have picketed plaintiff's place of business and 
his customer's places of business where plaintiff was installing 
his equipment and otherwise sought to induce other employ-
ers and employees to refuse to deal with plaintiff or handle 
his products, which practices succeeded in injuring plaintiff's 
business. According to plaintiff, he was approached during 
1949, before Local1 was formed, by defendants who demanded 
the right to be the exclusive bargainers for his employees 
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and to execute a contract to that end. He refused because 
his employees did not want to join the union. Threats of 
picketing and of preventing suppliers and subcontractors 
from working on the jobs were made by defendants. De-
fendants engaged in concerted action against plaintiff con-
:-;isting of picketing and advising plaintiff's customers not 
to deal with him, and coercing the contractors by threat-
ening to call off the men on their jobs if they continued to 
deal with plaintiff. The activity was successful, causing con-
siderable damage to plaintiff's business. The injunction re-
strained the foregoing activities. 
Plaintiff seeks to justify the injunction on the basis of the 
,Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, § 1115 et seq.) con-
sidered in Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Dn:vers Union, 
ante, p. 368 [254 P.2d 544]. Defendants claim the act 
is unconstitutional and that it does not apply here because 
their concerted activities did not arise out of a dispute be-
tween them and Local1 (see Lab. Code, § 1118) but had been 
in existence prior to Local 1 's formation. Plaintiff also relies 
upon section 923 of the Labor Code. 
Beyond doubt the case is controlled exclusively by the Na-
tional Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and is 
within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, 
and any state policy, legislative or judicial, must give way. 
The act sets up a comprehensive system dealing with repre-
srntation in collective bargaining and unfair labor practices 
on the part of both management and labor organizations. Its 
cleelared policy is that industrial strife which interferes with 
the flow of interstate commerce can be avoided or minimized 
if rmployers, employees and labor organizations each recognize 
the other's legitimate rights, and the purpose of the act is to 
preserve the legitimate rights of employers and employees 
and to provide for orderly and peaceful procedures to achieve 
tl1e:"r goals. (29 U.S.C.A. § 141.) Rights are assured to em-
ployres "to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organi7.ations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mntual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to re-
frain from any or all of snch activities except to the ext<:>nt 
that snch right may be affected by an agreement requiring 
Jllrmhership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
mrnt as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title." (Jd., 
§ 157.) Certain activities on the part of the employer are de-
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(;Jared unfair labor practices, such as "to interfere with, rP-
si rain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in sectiou 157 of this title; ... by discrimination in 
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or con-
dition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in 
this sub-chapter, or in any other statute of the United States, 
t>hall preclude an employer from making an agreement with 
a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted 
by any action defined in section 158(a) of this title as an 
unfair labor practiee) to require as a condition of employ-
ment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day follow-
ing the beginning of such employment or the effective date of 
such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor 
org·anization i" the representative of the employees as pro-
vided in section 1:'59 (a) of this title, in the appropriate col-
lective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when mad(>; 
and ( ii) if, following the most recent election held as provided 
in section 159 (e) of this title the Board shall have certified 
that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in 
such election have voted to authorize such labor organization 
to make such an ag-reement: Provided further, 'l'hat no em-
ployer shall justify any discrimination against an employee 
for nonmembership in a labor organization (a) if he has 
reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was 
not available to the employee on the same terms and eon-
(litions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he 
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was 
denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the 
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees 
uniformly req aired as a condition of acquiring or retaining 
membership .... '' (Id., § 158 [a] [1] and [3]) Similarly it 
is unfair practice for a labor organization to " ( 1) restrain or 
coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed 
in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph 
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe 
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of 
membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of 
his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining 
or the adjustment of grievances; (2) to cause or attempt to 
eause an employer to discriminate against an employee in 
violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discrim-
inate against an employee with respect to whom membership 
in snch organization has been denied or terminated on some 
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ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues 
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of 
acquiring or retaining membership; . . . ( 4) to engage in, 
or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to 
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their 
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or com-
modities or to perform any services, where an object thereof 
is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed 
person to join any labor or employer organization or any em-
ployer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other 
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person; (B) forcing or requiring any 
other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organiza-
tion as the representative of his employees unless such labor 
organization has been certified as the representative of such 
employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title; 
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain 
with a particular labor organization as the representati.ve of 
his employees if another labor organization has been certified 
as .the representative of such employees under the provisions 
of section 159 of this title; . . . (c) The expressing of any 
views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, 
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not 
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under 
any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression 
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.'' 
(Id., § 158 [b] [1] [2] [4] and [c].) The board has jurisdic-
tion to determine the proper bargaining representative on 
petition of employees, labor organization, or employer and for 
elections to that end. (Id., § 159.) Also, it is given power to 
prevent engaging in unfair labor practices and to invoke 
federal court jurisdiction to that end. (Id., § 160.) That 
jurisdiction excludes injunctive relief by the state courts. 
(Gerry of Cal1:{ornia v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119 [194 
P.2d 689] ; In re DeSilva, 33 Cal.2d 76 [199 P.2d 6].) 
'fhe trend of the decisions of the courts is that state regu-
lation is not applicable either on the theory of occupation of 
the field of regulating strikes, picketing and boycotts by the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, or that such con-
certed action falls within the protection of section 157 of the 
law quoted supra; that minority picketing for recognition 
is not subject to state regulation. One phase of the problem 
Mar.1953] SoMMER v. METAL TRADES CouNCIL 
[4() C.2d 392; 254 P.2d 559] 
409 
was considered by this court in Gerry of California v. Superior 
Court, supra, 32 Cal.2d 119, and In re DeSilva, supra, 33 Cal. 
2d 76. In both of those cases picketing of an employer was 
done by a union to organize the employer's employees. An 
injunction was sought on the ground that the conduct con-
sisted of an unfair labor practice under the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, no state law being violated. It was 
decided in the Gerry case that there was an unfair labor prac-
tice and in the DeSilva case that was ''assumed.'' We 
held that an injunction could not stand because the exclusive 
jurisdiction to prevent a violation of the act rested with 
the National Labor Relations Board. While we were pri-
marily concerned with whether the state courts had jurisdic-
tion to enforce a violation of the national act rather than 
whether a state could enforce its own labor regulation where 
interstate commerce was affected, we reviewed the whole 
field as to the place occupied by the federal law and that 
left to the states. We stated in the DeSilva case, summarizing 
the holding of the Gerry case (p. 78): "This court there [in the 
Gerry case] held that the declared intent and purpose of the 
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, was to vest exclusive 
jurisdiction in the National Labor Relations Board over unfair 
labor practices affecting interstate commerce and to vest in the 
courts generally jurisdiction only of actions for damages 
arising out of the commission of such practices, and that the 
act deprived the superior courts of original equitable jurisdic-
tion in such cases." (Emphasis added.) In the Gerry case 
the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Amalga-
mated U. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 
[ 60 S. Ct. 561, 84 L.Ed. 738] was summarized: "The Supreme 
Court pointed out that the course of procedure was definite 
and restricted; that the board and the board alone could de-
termine whether an employer had engaged in an unfair labor 
practice; that the board was chosen as the instrument or 
agency, exclusive of any private person or group, to assure 
protection from the described unfair conduct in order to 
remove obstnwtions to interstate commerce, and that the 
board alone was authorized to take proceedings to enforce 
its order. The sole authority of the board to secure prevention 
of unfair labor practices affecting commerce was thus recog-
nized. That section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act 
committed to the boarcl the exclusive power to decide whether 
unfair labor practices by the employer had been engaged in 
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and to determine the action that shotlld be taken to remove 
or avoid the eonseqttenees thereof was again stated . ... The 
most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court to come 
to our attention is in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State 
Labor Relat?:ons Board, supra ( [330 U.S. 767, 91 L.Ed. 1234] 
67 S.Ct. 1026, reversing 295 N.Y. 601 and 607 [64 N.E.2d 
3:JO]), wherein it was held that state and federal action cov-
en:ng the subject matter of the National Labor Relations Act 
could not coexist." (Emphasis added.) (Gen·y of Caliform:a 
v. Su.pe1·ior Gaud, 32 Cal.2d 119, 124 [194 P.2d 689].) That 
discussion means that in cases such as this it rests with the 
board to determine, at least at this stage of the proceeding, 
whether an unfair labor practice has been committed and to 
take such action as it deems advisable. This court cannot, 
therefore, be concerned with the question of whether in fact 
there have been unfair labor practices committed. 
Since the DeSilva case the Supreme Court of the United 
States has continued in the same direction. It held in La 
C1·osse Tel. Cm·p. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board, 336 
U.S. 18 [69 S.Ct. 379. 93 L.Ed. 463], that the federal act con-
trolled questions relating to representation of employees. Al-
goma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations 
Board, 336 U.S. 301 [69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691], seemed to 
take a step backward, but in Plankinton Packing Co. v. W?:s-
consin Emp. Relations Board, 338 U.S. 953 [70 S.Ct. 491, 
94 L.Ed. 588], the decision of the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin holding that Wisconsin's labor relations law as to 
unfair labor practices controlled, was reversed without opin-
ion. In International Union of U. A., A. & A. & I. W. v. 
O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 [70 S.Ct. 781, 94 I..J.Ed. 978], a Mich-
igan strike control law which required a prior notice and 
a majority vote before a strike, was held inapplicable be-
cause of the federal act, in that it attempted to limit a federal 
right of employees to engage in concerted activities and to 
strike, and that the federal act regulated such rights. The 
court concluded the opinion by referring to certain areas in 
which state action was proper, ineluding a discussion of the 
cases, such as Internat,ional Union, U. A. W. v. Wisconsin 
Emp. Relations Boanl, 336 U.S. 245 [69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 
651], heavily relied upon by plaintiff and showing that the 
J ul'isdictional Strike I_jaw is not in the class of activity re-
served for state action. The court said: "International Union, 
U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 [69 
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S.Ct. :i16. f):l IJ_gd_ fiiill (Hl49). upon which Michigan prin-
(~ipally rdies, was not i'Oll('Pnwd with a traditional, peaceful 
strike for higher wag·c:;;. The employees' eomlnet there was 'a 
new teeJmique for bringing pressure upon the employer,' a 
'recurrent or interlllittent unannounced stoppage of work to 
\Yill nm:tated end:,;.' l (1. at 249, 264. That activity we re-
garded as 'coercive,' similar to the sit-down strike held to 
fall outside the protection of the federal act in National Labor 
Relations Board v. Fansteel 111 etallu.rgical Corp. ( 1939), 306 
U.S. 240 [59 S.Ct. 490, 83 hEel. 627, 123 A.L.R. 599] (1939), 
and to the labor violence held to be subject to state police 
control in Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations 
Board, 315 U.S. 740 [62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154] (1942). 
In the ·wisconsin Auto. \Vorkers case, we concluded that the 
union tactic was 'neither forbidden by federal statute nor 
was it legalized and approved thereby.' 336 U.S. at 265. 
'There is no existing or possible conflict or overlapping be-
tween the authority of the Federal and State Boards, be-
cause the Federal Board has no authority either to investigate, 
approve or forbid the union conduct in question. This con-
duct is g'overnable by the State or it is entirely ungoverned.' 
I d. at 254. Clear'ly, 1ue reaffirmed the principle that if 'Con-
gress has protected the nnion cond~tct which the State has 
forbidden ... the state legislation must yield.' I d. at 252." 
(Emphasis added.) (Internat?:onal Union of U. A., A. & I. W. 
v. O'Brien, supra, 339 U.S. 454, 459.) The court summarized 
the area still open to state action in Allen-Bradley Local No. 
1111 v. Wisconsin Ernp. Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 [62 
S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154], stating that: "[T]he state's exer-
cise of its police power (e.g., the prevention of mass picketing 
of the employer's factory, threatening personal injury or prop-
erty damage to employees desiring to work, obstructing en-
trance to and egress from the employer's factory, obstruct-
ing the streets and public roads, picketing the homes of em-
ployees, and other breaches of the peace in connection with 
labor disputes) was not intended to be excluded by the pro-
visions of the National Labor Relations Act, and that the 
exercise of that power by the state could stand consistently 
with the operation of the federal act." (Gerry of California 
v. Superior Court, s1rpra, 32 Cal.2d 119, 125.) The conduct 
here involved does not fall in that category. I believe it is 
clear that the circumstances existing here present either a 
case of an unfair labor practice, or that the conduct is pro-
tected by the national act (29 U.S.C.A. § 157), which ques-
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tions are, in this state at least, determinable by the National 
Board. 
The court had no jurisdiction, therefore, to grant the in-
junction and I would reverse the order. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1953. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 21803. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
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[1] Labor-Findings and Conclusions.-Where the question of de-
fendant television society's claimed organizational and picket-
ing rights concerns wrestlers whose contests are televised, 
but the evidence is neither clear nor conclusive that such 
wrestlers are employees of plaintiff promoters and not inde-
pendent contractors, and the factual problem involved be-
cause of exclusion of independent contractors from the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act is not necessarily finally resolved 
by the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the trial court 
is justified, pending a hearing on the merits, in coming to 
the tentative conclusion that the relationship falls into an 
"entrepreneurial enterprise," rather than into employment sub-
ject to the protections of the federal act. 
[2] Id.-Jurisdiction.-If the jurisdictional issue involved in de-
fendant society's televising of wrestling contests is resolved 
by a determination that wrestlers are independent contractors 
and thus excluded from the National Labor Relations Act, 
judicial investigation of the bona fides of defendant as a 
labor organization can take place only in the state forum. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Labor, § 29; [2, 3] Labor, § 24; 
[4] Labor, § 18; [5, 6] Labor, § 25. 
